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INTRODUCTION
The Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport
The airport is designed around six major runways: four
parallel north-south runways and two diagonal, or crosswind,
runways. It is claimed that the airport will be able to
handle approximately 180 operations per peak hour in instru-
mental weather (IFR) conditions and well over 250 operations
per peak hour under visual (VFR) conditions. The master
plan also envisions a pair of 2,000-foot short take-off and
landing (STOL) runways with separate facilities. In addition,
twelve commercial terminals and a major cargo terminal were
planned. These thirteen terminal buildings are to line the
nine-mile spine lane that connects the north and south ends
of the airport. (See Appendix, p. 2, 3, 4.)
At this writing, two of the four north-south parallel
runways are constructed, each slightly more than 11,000 feet
in length, and one of the two diagonal runways has been con-
structed. Four of the thirteen semi-circle shaped terminal
buildings have been constructed and the foundation is in
place for the fifth terminal building. The terminals are
modular, constructed :from pre-cast beams, columns, and floors
to enable relatively quick and easy assembly. (See Appendix,
pp. 5-6.) Moreover, the airport is designed so that any
aspect of planned expansion can be undertaken with minimal
disruption to the existing facility. For example, the Air-
trans terminal-to-terminal people-mover network can be ex-
tended without interrupting taxiways or roadways; similarly,
roadways can be expanded without interrupting Airtrans or
flight patterns. New runways can be built, as well as the
short take-off and landing (STOL) port, without interrupting
other parts of the operating facility. The chief project
engineer and the airport manager reported that it was rela-
tively expensive to construct the airport to enable expan-
sion with little interruption to the existing operation.
Lastly, providing the various subsystems work as advertised,
D/FW is not unpleasing to the eye nor overly difficult to
use once one is familiar with it.
When we began to investigate the policy process that
led to the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport, we did not
expect that it would become one of the year's most note-
worthy political issues in this area. Media coverage offers
unusual opportunity for studying political impact, but it
also presents significant difficulties. Access to decision
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makers and information, always a problem, is particularly
difficult for a publicly sensitive issue. However, we
have acquired remarkable amounts of information and our
subsequent analysis offers potentially interesting proposi-
tions.
The airport began operating January 13, 1974. From
inception through construction, and now into the operational
phase, the long, often dramatic and colorful sequence of
choices leading to.D/FW offer an unusual opportunity to
examine an array of interesting questions about the cluster
of technologies that we label an airport.. Our purpose, as
reflected in this research report, is to improve our under-
standing of the plan and design of large technical systems
and their effect on society.
We will.attempt to trace underlying social, political,
and technical assumptions that led to the plan and-design
for D/FW. We will begin by reviewing the history of the
regional airport concept in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. A
pattern or cycle is. evident revealing ever increasing invest-
ment in the same idea. The history of explicit conflict
and implicit consensus leading to D/FW provides insight into
the constraints and assumptions inherited by the policy makers
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and planners as they began to consider the D/FW project.
We then attempt to identify some of the basic assumptions
held by the policy makers and technical experts regarding
the purpose and function of D/FW as those assumptions
affected its plan and design. And lastly, when these
basic assumptions are compared to the events that have
enveloped the airport since it began operating, one can
begin to assess the quality of those beliefs about future
needs and the utility of present techniques for meeting
them.
In general, this research suggests that central ques-
tions regarding airport design may revolve around the con-
cept of flexibility. That is, public.projects such as re-
gional airports are expensive to build and to operate,
requiring considerable commitment from relevant local and
regional governmental units and, ultimately, the taxpayers
themselves. Thus, our findings suggest that it is especially
important that public projects as expensive and committing
as a regional airport be designed to readily adapt to unan-
ticipated changes in the economic, social, and political
environments. Our analysis should not be seen as an indict-
ment of particularly maladroit expectations and projections.
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It is not! Rather, our attempt is to suggest that present
methodological techniques for assessing future needs, tech-
nical problems, or social conditions clearly are not ade-
quate. In other words, those who invest heavily in a par-
ticular vision of the future (like horse #3 will win race
#2) are likely to lose heavily. But, one cannot stop; needs
must be met, plans laid, and projects (even very large ones)
undertaken. Thus, we conclude that such enterprises must
be entered from an assumption of maximum flexibility to
meet unforseen developments. This means they must be de-
signed for simplicity to minimize fixed capital costs, over-
head costs, and costs of adapting to changed environmental
conditions.
Consequently, this research has suggested to us the
following propositions that attempt to illuminate the conse-
quences of designs which concentrate on criteria other than
those which maximize adaptability. First, we find that the
greater the excess capacity (that is, underutilized structural
and technical capability), the more likely one is to find
political conflict occasioned by. the widening gap between
expected and observed performance. In this context, we will
suggest that D/FW may be overly large for present needs, over-
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utilizing intensive technologies which in turn reduce re-
liability. Such excesses result in relatively high fixed
costs and, in the case of D/FW, the gap is further widened
by less than predicted revenue. Local leaders anticipated
that D/FW would be able to pay its own way, and there is
widespread concern, even bickering, with regard to these
surprisingly high costs and low revenues. (A similar pro-
position is forwarded by Zwerling in his study of the Bay
Area Rapid Transit project. S. Zwerling, Mass Transit and
the Politics of Technology, Praeger, 1974.)
'In this regard, litigation between the airlines and
the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth is in progress. Though
the disagreements focus on whether or not to close Dallas'
Love Field to all commercial traffic, it appears that Love
Field has become something of a scapegoat. Many financial
and governmental leaders in the region, looking for simple,
clear answers to the surprising, lackluster performance of
D/FW to date, want to believe that all would be well if Love
were closed. Our research suggests that this simply is not
the case.
Litigation is also in progress regarding the relation-
ship between D/FW and local taxing authorities. From the
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perspective of revenue-hungry local governments, the question
is: can D/FW provide substantial tax income? Naturally, the
airport board and the airport administrators are vitally in-
terested in restraining local communities' power to tax D/FW.
At this point, the board and administrative authorities are
very concerned about operating deficits and debt service.
They are not likely to view kindly local communities taking
even bigger slices of their already overburdened revenue pie.
Thus, though it has been operating one year, it appears
that conflict.concerning D/FW is already manifest. But until
some of the questions before the courts are resolved, we can
say no more about this proposition than political conflict de-
rives from excesscapacity. The outcome of these.disagree-
ments over taxing authority well may be important for the sur-
vival of the airport, and depending on the outcome in the local
courts, we would expect that conflict could demonstrate itself
in other ways--perhaps the historical antagonism between the
leaderships of Dallas and Fort Worth will once again character-
ize their relationship.
Our second proposition specifies that those who were
part of the decision-making process.leading to D/FW.thought
of the airport more as a means to symbolic and economic ends
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than as a means to meet the needs of commercial aircraft
technologies or passengers. In other words, all expected
that the airport would have a significant multiplier effect
on the region. In more formal language, we are speaking
here of the assumption of export-base models. In this re-
gard, the local leadership appears to have gambled that a
significant regional airport would increase local exports
(from the Dallas-Fort Worth, S.M.S.A.), thereby generating
earnings that, in part, would be spent to purchase locally
produced goods and services, thus generating still more
employment, income, and production in the locale. But this
multiplier effect rests on growing national and international
economies, and since D/FW has been in operation, the national
and international economic situation does not seem to have
provided a congenial setting for such growth.
Local expectations may be disappointed in the short
term., The Civil.Aeronautics Board (CAB) has slowed down its
decision regarding airlines' requests for significantly ex-
panded international route structures from D/FW.* Thus,: to
*As of this writing, January 17, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Ross I.Newmann recommended that Pan American Airways should be
given. the exclusive rights to fly international routes from
D/FW. Braniff Airlines has already filed a petition before
the CAB for reconsideration of the Newmann decision. (Dallas
Times Herald, January 18, 1975)
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date, the economic and psychological boost anticipated from
Dallas' growth into an internationally significant airport,
in our opinion, has been slow to materialize. Many seem to
believe that air cargo will not increase substantially unless
D/FW can obtain improved international routes, which further
weakens D/FW's economic effect on the region. But additional
study may show that in the long run the airport will fulfill
the expectations of the plan.
We cannot predict how the business and political leader-
ship will respond if the desired air routes are not approved
or if, once approved, the new routes do not make much difference.
But their response, regardless of the particular outcome, will
offer evidence relevant for a third proposition.
This proposition, which follows from the previous one,
argues that D/FW was planned and designed to be a symbol of
modernity, strength, and vitality, in order to reinforce per-
ceptions of the Dallas-Fort Worth area as a rapidly developing
world financial and trade center.
A fourth proposition can be derived from the previous
two. This notion argues that expensive, technical niceties
such as Airtrans' people-movers and the fully automated Telecar
9
baggage system result more from symbolic than functional needs.
The irony is that, because such technical niceties are costly,
if they do not work as advertised, they have a double-barreled
impact on the symbolic image they are supposed to enhance.
First, they add to capital and operating costs which means
that budget balancing will be even more difficult if, as in
the case of D/FW, short-term revenue predictions are opti-
mistic. Second, the experience at D/FW indicates that such
technical systems are particularly noticeable (newsworthy)
and if they don't function reliably, the result is unhappy
user experiences, bad press, and more unexpected costs. In
summary, it may be a considerable risk to undertake large,
technically intensive projects primarily intended to stimu-
late regional political and economic growth.
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The Present in Perspective
In the not so distant past, the cities of Dallas and
Fort Worth were arch rivals, and cooperation between the
two had been the exception rather than the rule. For over
three decades this rivalry blocked the development of a
single regional airport to serve the two cities as well as
the North Texas metroplex. The conflict was fueled by
antagonisms and distrusts between strong personalities among
the leadership in both communities. One person from Fort
Worth must be singled out in this regard--Amon G. Carter,
"Mr. Fort Worth." He was the owner and publisher of the
Fort Worth Star Telegram, a man who spent a great deal of his
time and wealth in the hope of bettering Fort Worth. He
was particularly interested in improving Fort Worth at the
expense of her sister city, Dallas. It is more difficult
to single out such a person from Dallas, but if one had to
do so, Woodall Rodgers, Mayor of Dallas from 1939 to 1947,
would be that individual.
Attempts to spark a jointly sponsored airport began in
1940 when Governor W. Lee O'Daniel appointed the Texas Aero-
nautics Advisory Committee to prepare a master plan of air-
port development for the State. During public hearings,
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this committee, supported by the Civil Aeronautics Adminis-
tration(CAA), proposed that a jointly sponsored airport
be constructed between the two cities. The committee felt
that it did not make good sense financially to develop
both cities' airports--Fort Worth's Meacham Field and
Dallas' Love Field. Between October and December of 1940,
representatives from both cities met and considered various
proposals. At the end of three months of negotiations the
two cities jointly agreed to sponsor a military airport in
the mid-cities area. But the Fort Worth leadership stub-
bornly held to its own Meacham Field for the commercial
traffic while Dallas just as obstinately argued to retain
Love Field for commercial airlines. On December 12, 1940,
A. B. McMullen, CAA Director of Airports, indicated that
neither city would receive federal funds due to their
failure to get together on a joint airport. He went on to
say that the government was not trying to high-pressure
this project, but the CAA felt it would be a waste of money
to develop a class 4 airport at each city. 1
As the possibility of.war increased, however, the CAA
1 Fritz-Alan Korth, A Tale of Two Cities, Princeton Univer-
sity, Senior Thesis, p. 3.
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became very interested in constructing a centrally located
airport in the Dallas/Fort Worth area that could be used as
a military field. It persuaded the city of Arlington (pop-
ulation 4,000 in 1940)--which is almost midway between Dallas
and Fort Worth--to sponsor such an airport. Braniff Airlines
and American Airlines jointly purchased the necessary land
and deeded it to Arlington, which was to be responsible for
operating and maintaining the airport. 2 This agreement be-
tween the city of Arlington and the CAA shocked both Dallas
and Fort Worth out of their complacency. Once again, nego-
tiations were renewed by both cities and the CAA.
Between late 1940 and mid-1943, several meetings were
held in which all interested parties attempted to resolve
the impasse regarding location and control of the proposed
airport as well as the future of Love and Meacham Fields in
the scheme of the area's overall airport needs.
Fort Worth's proposal called for construction of the
terminal building on the west side of the airport, while
Dallas wanted the terminal in a more neutral location at the
north end of the.airport. A verbal skirmish between the two
2 American Airlines tended to side with Fort Worth through-
out the airport controversy, perhaps because Amon G. Carter
was on its Board of Directors.
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cities ensued, and Mayor Woodall Rodgers of Dallas was at
the apex of the controversy. Rodgers complained that "con-
struction of the project along the lines proposed by Fort
Worth, with the building backing toward Dallas, would be
considered a personal insult toward the people of Dallas."
(Dallas Morning News, 9 Jan. 1942.) He went on to say:
If the CAA does follow (Amon) Carter's dictation,
however, I think a statue should be erected to
him atop the administration building and the air-
port should be named 'Carter Field' to complete the
insult to Dallas. (Dallas Morning News, 10 Jan.
1942.)
The history of the controversy suggests that the per-
sonal antagonism between the two community leaders contributed
significantly to the cities' problems.. On the other hand, it
provided each with a ready-made "fall-guy." Both men,
largely for selfish reasons, attempted to influence the CAA
in favor of their respective communities and ignored the
overall needs of the areas. .But more importantly, this ini-
tial controversy over the site selection for a "regional"
airport was to carry over to the following decades. The
scenario was always the same.
The airport, proposed by the CAA in 1940, was completed
and approved by them on July 2, 1943. Thus Midway Airport,
under Arlington's control, began operation.
14
The Greater Fort Worth International Airport
After prolonged negotiations and repeated failures,
both Dallas and Fort Worth began to formalize their own
plans in late 1943 to make their individual city's airport
the "super airport" of the north Texas area. In Dallas,
there was even talk of building a downtown airport, possibly
on reclaimed Trinity River bottom land. In the meantime,
according to one of our interviewees, some airlines were
tiring of landing first at Fort Worth's Meacham Field then
taking off for the 30-mile flight to Dallas' Love Field.
Four years later, in October, 1947, the city of Fort
Worth announced.that Arlington's Midway Airport would be
developed jointly with the airlines as Fort Worth's major
airport--a proclamation that completely surprised the people
of Dallas. This unexpected move had been engineered by
Dallas' old nemesis, Amon G. Carter. He was determined to
build Midway into the airport for the north Texas region,
and it was renamed "Greater Fort Worth International Airport"
to reflect Carter's determination. (Korth, p. 24.) Carter's
plan had the blessing of the CAA which was willing to provide
$340,000 in federal matching funds for general improvement
of the site. (Korth, p. 26.)
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It did not take the Dallas leadership long to react.
On November 14, 1947, the Dallas City Council issued a
statement that they intended to "keep Love Field the South-
west's best airport...." For former mayor Woodall Rodgers it
seemed to be the ghost of his battle fought five years before.
The basic issues from earlier days were renewed and, for the
first time, Dallas' Love Field was facing real competition.
The CAA's 1948 National Airport Plan added fuel to the fire
when they proposed to upgrade the Greater Fort Worth Inter-
national Airport to a Class 6 airport--(6,500- foo t to 7,500-
foot runways)--and that it be developed into the major Fort
Worth/Dallas Airport, while Love and Meacham Fields would
be used as feeder and auxiliary fields. Dallas took its
fight to Congress and the courts. In Congress, Representa-
tive Frank Wilson of Dallas was at first successful in
blocking 2.6 million dollars allocated under the National
Airport Plan for Greater Fort Worth International Airport.
But it was a short-lived victory for Dallas. The Senate
and a joint committee of Congress approved the complete
package, and on May 29, 1948, President Truman signed it
into law. (Korth, pp. 33-34.)
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Even before their defeat in Congress, the Dallas leader-
ship had decided to work through the CAA to stop the de-
velopment of the Greater Fort Worth International Airport.
Dallas' efforts proved unsuccessful, and on July 3, 1948,
the CAA announced its formal approval for the construction
to begin on the Fort Worth "regional" airport plan.3
Dallas, having been thwarted in its efforts, adopted
yet another strategy. On September 15, 1948, the city of
Dallas filed a petition in the U. S. Court of Appeals for
review of all CAA proceedings. On February 1, 1949, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals formally dismissed the case.
The City appealed the case to the Supreme Court, but the
Court elected not to review the case.
Now that Dallas had been defeated in the Congress and
the courts, the leadership of Fort Worth moved ahead swiftly.
They secured supporting and matching funds from the CAA and
proceeded to expand and remodel the airport. In an eight-
month period from August 1948 to April 1949 Fort Worth re-
ceived 1.4 million dollars in federal subsidies to develop
3Dallas also appealed, over the CAA head, to the Depart-
ment of Commerce for a hearing and was turned down on
September 11, 1948.
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Greater Fort Worth International Airport. During the same
period, the city of Dallas was in federal disfavor and
temporarily immobilized,4 and was receiving minimal support
from the CAA. In May 1950, however, the Dallas City Council,
with strategy exhausted, voted to spend $1,302,299 on Love
Field improvements "in an effort to prevent heavy losses of
airline business to Love Field."5
Between 1951 and 1953, periodic attempts were made to
revive a joint airport for the two cities. (Korth, pp. 47-61.)
As in the past, strong personalities, suspicions, and com-
petitive pride in each community led to a breakdown in ne-
gotiations,.
In July 1951, the city of Dallas hired James Buckley,
Terminal and Transportation Consultants from New York to
study the potential of Love Field. After a year's work,
Buckley. reported that the Dallas/Fort Worth area needed
both Love Field and the new Fort.Worth regional airport.
4 Early in 1949, the CAA withdrew a $144,000 appropriation
allocated to extend the runway at Love Field.
5 Dallas Morning News, 7 May 1950
Interestingly, in 1948, the city of Dallas seriously con-
sidered converting Love Field to industrial use if the
city lost its battle to stop major airlines from moving
to Midway Airport. (Dallas Morning News, 12 Sept. 1948.)
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More significantly, Buckley reported that because of the
population distribution, Dallas could demand a minimum of
62 per cent of the flights in the area.6 He further recom-
mended that Dallas spend 17 million dollars on Love Field
during the next decade (1953 to 1963) in order to satisfy a
rapidly increasing demand. Armed with such a favorable re-
port the Dallas leadership was not particularly interested
in cooperating in a joint-effort, regional airport. In fact,
five months after receiving the Buckley report, the City
Council of Dallas, supported by the Dallas Chamber of Com-
merce, called for a 20 million dollar bond election in order
to provide funds for expanding and remodeling Love Field.
The bond issue was overwhelmingly approved on January 27,
1953, thus clearing the way for Dallas to expand its airport
without federal aid.
After nearly fifteen years of political skirmishing
regarding a regional airport, the Fort Worth City Council
considered the issue irresolvable and on February 26, 1953,
formally named its airport "The Greater Fort Worth Inter-
national Airport, Amon G. Carter Field". It became opera-
tional on April 25, 1953.
6 This means that 62 per cent of the people were more
conveniently served by Love Field than by the Fort Worth
airport. Today approximately 75 per cent of all people
that use the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport are from Dallas.
(Korth, p. 49.)
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Carter Field vs Love Field
For a time, the new Fort Worth airport prospered.
However, the only airline that offered substantial service
to Fort Worth was American Airlines. At this time, 26
flights per day originated from Carter Field as against
34 from Love Field. It soon was evident to the airlines
that Love Field serviced considerably more than half the
travelers utilizing the area's airport facilities. More-
over, the feeder lines had not shifted enough flights to
Carter Field to justify the longer trips, especially those
of American Airlines 7 originating from the Fort Worth air-,
port.
Only two and a half years after Carter Field opened
the Fort Worth leadership had become concerned about the
decline of service at its.airport. The increase in pas-
senger traffic at Love Field for the fiscal year 1955 was
almost equal to the total number of enplaning passengers
7 American was the only airline that substantially improved
its service at Carter Field. Braniff had planned to, but
did not. One possible reason would be that Braniff hoped
to "get the Jump" on American Airlines by staying in Dallas.
It was originally thought that Braniff was going to move
its headquarters to Fort Worth from Tulsa. Dallas made
the airlines a better deal, however, and Brani:ff Airlines
moved to Dallas instead.
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at Fort Worth's Carter Field. That year Love Field en-
planed 781,420 passengers, a gain of 165,522 over the
previous year, as compared to only 165,632 total passengers
for Carter Field for the same period, an approximate ratio
of 6 to 1 enplaning passengers favoring Love Field. (Re-
ported in the Dallas Morning News, 9 Dec. 1955.)
Between 1953 and 1956 several hearings regarding air
service were held by the CAB, and because of rapid growth
at Love Field the various appeals and decisions began to
favor Love Field. 8 At one point in these hearings Chan
Gurney, Chairman of the CAB, suggested that Fort Worth sell,
at the original cost, half of Carter Field to Dallas and
that the airport's name be changed to Dallas-Fort Worth
Airport or another neutral name. The Fort Worth city leaders,
with the concurrence of Amon Carter, supported this proposal
and suggested changing the airport's name to the Dallas-Fort
Worth International Airport, Carter Field. By this time
8 The decision in the "Central Airlines" case initially
favored Carter Field, but finally Dallas.was able to per-
suade the CAB to allow some flights from Love Field. Also,
the "Northeast-Southwest" case ruling favored Love:Field
over Carter Field. In this case, CAB examiner William J.
Madden accused American Airlines of discriminating against
Dallas.
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(1955), however, it was obvious to the Dallas leadership
that Carter Field was in financial trouble. Moreover, -the
City of Dallas now had too much invested in Love Field to
abandon it, and it was evident that Love Field's share of
the passengers and flights was growing in the competition
between the two airports. It is not surprising, then, that
the City of Dallas rejected Fort Worth's offer, thus ending
the last real effort to reconcile the divisions that had
developed between Dallas and Fort Worth leaders over the
cities' respective airports.
At this point a brief recapitulation is in order. .First,
strong personalities from both communities tended to inter-
fere with attempted compromise and reconciliation over air-
port development. Second, Fort Worth was simply not the.
calibre of financial and industrial community that.generated
great air travel . Third, although Carter Field may have
been an ideal midpoint location for a joint regional airport
between the two cities,,its viability was jeopardized when
the City of Dallas decided to expand Love Field, and naturally a
regional airport must have the support of Dallas and its
suburban communities. Fourth, no strong, sustained leader-
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ship for the regional airport concept was forthcoming from
the CAA or its successor, the FAA. Rather, the guidance
from the federal agencies was episodic and vacillating. If
the CAA had made a definitive "either/or" decision on a
regional airport in the early stages of the controversy, a
great deal of money could have been saved and much incon-
venience avoided. Fifth, a reconciliation between the two
cities regarding a regional airport would require a site nearly
mid-point between them. In fact, at no time were other sites
seriously considered for a jointly sponsored airport.
Between 1955 and mid-1965, when negotiators for the
two cities signed a memorandum agreeing in principle to a
regional airport serving the metroplex, Fort Worth had re-
peatedly initiated legal action against various airlines
for inadequacy of service. Evidence presented at these
hearings indicated that Fort Worth and Carter Field were
not generating enough passengers to support the desired
level of service.. The CAB, on the other hand, was more
concerned about the type and number of flights that should
originate from Dallas' Love Field. A reservation-card
survey conducted by the air carriers from December 3 to 6,
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1962, showed that more than 80 per cent of the 22,101 area
passengers originated at points closer to Love Field than to
Greater Southwest International Airport. For flights of
less than 250 Miles, the figure increased to nearly 84 per
cent.9  The CAB supported Love Field as the most convenient
airport for Dallas passengers. 10
Although Love Field was the more convenient airport,
it was also evident that Love Field's capacity for further
expansion to fulfill the air transportation needs of the
Dallas-Fort Worth area in 1980 was limited.11
In 1962 FAA Administrator Najeeb E. Halaby appeared
before a Congressional Appropriations Subcommittee and, re-
9 Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Investigation, Docket
13959, Civil Aeronautics Board, April 7, 1964, pp. 7-8.
In 1961 Fort Worth was successful in having the FAA ap-
prove a grant for 1.6 million dollars to extend the north/
south runway at Greater Southwest across Highway 183.
10 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
11 For details regarding airport expansion requests in the
Dallas-Fort Worth area, see pp. 12-21 in CAB Hearings
#13959. There was some speculation that the City of Dallas
was considering an airport site to the east of the city
when and if Love Field became saturated.
24
ferring to the Dallas/Fort Worth airport controversy, in-
dicated that his Agency "refused to put another nickel...
into duplicate facilities twelve miles apart." Following
Halaby's lead, CAB examiner Ross I. Newmann began another
series of hearings in an attempt to determine which of the
two existing airports could best serve both cities. Newmann
decided in April, 1965, that:
It would not be in the public interest to designate
at this time either GSIA or Love Field as a regional
airport to serve the Dallas-Fort Worth area. 12
A few months later, in September 1965, the full CAB met and
ordered the cities to agree within 180 days on the location
for a new airport that would serve both cities. The CAB
further implied that if the Dallas-Fort Worth leadership
could not agree, then the CAB would decide for them. This
resolute CAB position engendered a new spirit of civic
leadership, harmony, and cooperation between the two com-
munities. For the first time in this long controversy the
cities were able to reach agreement and on June 1, 1965, the
CAB announced:
Both cities have agreed to obtain the services of a
completely independent airport planning consultant, an
engineer of national stature who will recommend, after
study to be done expeditiously (within 60 days if.
possible), the precise site, size, and configuration of
a regional airport, such site to be located between
Dallas and Fort Worth and limited only by Dallas and
Tarrant Counties, North and South. The cost of.the
study will be borne jointly by the two cities.
12 CAB Hearings #13959, p. 50.
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Dallas and Fort Worth have agreed to establish
an interim organization with power to take ini-
tial steps to insure the expeditious planning,
financing, and construction of the regional air-
port, the construction to be completed and oper-
ational by 1971 but in no event, later than 1973.
(CAB Press Release, 1 June 1965.)
In 1968, a permanent board--seven members from Dallas and
four from Fort Worth--was appointed by the respective city
councils to build and operate the new regional airport.
(See Appendix, p.11, for a more complete description of the
Airport Board.)
This brief historical review points to the fact that
for a quarter of a century (1940-1965) both cities' positions
remained basically unchanged. As the airline industry grew
and became increasingly important to both cities, the stakes
for each multiplied geometrically. Yet essentially the same
arguments were used over and over again, each city defending
the view that its airport should be the one developed. It
took the concerted, though certainly belated, efforts of the
CAB-FAA to bring the factious parties together in this joint
venture.
26
The Plan Disassembled
In addition to the foregoing historical constraints
embedded in the early D/FW plan, a further assumption is
important. The airport design began with a concept of the
maximum utilization of approach and departure corridors in
the mid-cities region. A joint effort carried out by Alan
M. Vorhees and Associates, Inc., Transportation and Planning
Consultants of McLean, Virginia, and the Federal Aviation
Administration was undertaken to construct a dynamic model
of the total airport facility.1 3 And, of course, the informa-
tion generated by this model is no more reliable than the
assumptions upon which it is based. The model simulated the
airport under conditions of total airspace saturation. The
subsequent criteria generated by the model helped to mold
the size and the shape of every aspect of the final struc-
ture. There is also evidence to suggest that this idea of
maximum airspace capacity was not solely responsible for the
very large edifice that is the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional
13 We have been unable to obtain sufficiently specific infor-
mation regarding this FAA-funded airspace simulation to
determine the assumptions of the model regarding air
traffic control and aircraft technologies. For example,
6,000 feet between parallel runways to provide for simul-
taneous approach and departure in IFR conditions, as well
as parallel approaches and departures in IFR conditions,
resulted from this maximum concept.
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Airport. Nevertheless, the maximum capacity premise
was reinforced by widespread confidence that the growth curve
for the airline industry, in terms of passenger use, passenger
miles, and cargo, as well as size and speed of aircraft, would
continue at relatively the same rate as it had during the
previous ten years.
From Table I, it is obvious that the projections calcu-
lated by Vorhees, the airlines, and the Airport Board are
"off the mark" according to our data. More precisely, the
calculated date (determined from actual data at Dallas Love
Field and Greater Southwest International Airport) indicate
for 1975 10.5 million enplanements as compared to the Vorhees
study of nearly 12 million and the Airport Board study of nearly
8 million. This is a 50 per cent spread of nearly 4 million
enplanements. By 1980, all three studies' projected en-
planement levels surpass the calculated data. The consult-
ant's slopes are so steep that by 1985 all predicted levels
exceed that of the calculated data by more than 30 per cent.
Even greater variance is portrayed in Table II. In the pro-
jections of cargo, our extended data for 1975 indicate only
87 thousand tons--the other predictions were at least 25 per
cent greater. Again, if one extends the curves, the consult-
ant's predictions appear to have been unrealistically optimistic.
These are clear examples of faulty planning assumptions.
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It is clear from the foregoing comparisons and from
our information about the airline industry more generally
that growth of passenger and cargo traffic will be less
rapid than the projections suggest. The jumbo jets have
not been as widely used as predicted; the SST has not mater-
ialized; long-term fuel limitations were not considered;
and the small, short-to-mid-range jet has a much larger
share of the market than had been anticipated ten years ago. 14
Many of the social and political problems the airport
has confronted since it opened seem to have resulted, at
least in part, from commitment to unreliable assumptions.
It is clear that much weight was given to basic assump-
tions in planning the size and capacity of the airport.
Assumptions are a valid part of planning decisions; however,
it must be recognized that they (e.g. national economic
growth, passenger usage, growth of air cargo, number of
persons using parking facilities) are often unreliable..
14,
A report dated 2 Jan. 1974 in the Dallas Morning News
claimed that American Airlines had grounded 10 of its 16
B-747's. TWA also had mothballed several B-747's and
taken 12 Convair 880's out of service. This action was
in response to the "fuel crisis" and a generally dampened
economy. As far as we know, neither these airlines nor
any others are operating as many jumbo jets as they had
planned.
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It is often argued that the consultants frequently act
simply to validate or confirm the assumptions and ambi-
tions of their clients rather than to perform independent
analysis.15 In the case of the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport,
however, one can see in the data just presented that
several different consulting groups were asked to provide
projections. Furthermore, one can note that there is wide
variation regarding initial levels in the consultants' pre-
dictions regarding future growth of the Dallas/Fort Worth
Airport. But notice that the slopes are optimistic, to say the
least. Though different levels simply project a constant
error, different slopes magnify errors through time.
The consultants appear to have been employed in the
Dallas-Fort Worth project responsibly. We can still see,
however, that even the most conservative projection quickly
surpasses the rather optimistic calculated data projection.
It may be that the basic assumptions in the plan, particu-
larly those regarding the future of supersonic air transport
and super jumbo jets, have ceased to be viable alternatives
15 An interviewee whose work was directly related to the
planning of the airport expressed and confirmed this notion.
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for the present because we have come to the end of an era
in American air-transport development. As an indication
of a changing point of view, we noted that the Congress
now witholds federal funds from any airport project unless
sponsors can prove that the facility will cause no environ-
mental damage or that no alternative site is available. 16
In other words, locating airports primarily to assauge
political differences or to maximize public accessibility
may no longer be as important,. at least in the view of the
Congress, as safety.and reducing possible impairment to the
physical and social environment. Clearly, this suggests
that if the D/FW planners had been subject to these criteria,
the location, or the design, and the scale of the airport
might have been different.
The Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Dallas-
Fort Worth Airport project, submitted in May, 1972, by the
firm of Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, and Stratton (TAMS),
was short and cursory. Essentially, it argued that the
projected site for the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport was not
16 Jerome E. Milch, "Feasible and Prudent Alternatives:
Airport Development in the Age of Protest." Paper pre-
pared for delivery at the 1974 APSA Meeting, p. 10.
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in an "important" physical, natural, or social setting,
and that there was very little worthwhile that could be
upset in this particular area.17
The United States Department of the Interior, re-
sponding to the TAMS Environmental Impact Statement,
argued that "the statement's conclusions regarding Bear
Creek flood discharge are misleading." [Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS), p. A-I.] The Interior Depart-
ment's response to the impact statement goes on to say
that the Environmental Impact Statement addresses itself
almost exclusively to the project's economic impact and
that equally intensive consideration ought to be accorded
the project's long-term effects on the environment (EIS,
p. A-2).
The Environmental Protection Agency, responding to
the TAMS impact statement, claimed that it "does not fully
address itself to what happens to the environment without
the project." (EIS, p. A-6.) The EPA.states that noise
levels are listed in decibels in the. TAMS statement and
that there is no indication as to how the levels were
17 TAMS is a New York based firm of consulting engineers
who were given overall responsibility for coordinating
all aspects of the D/FW project.
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measured. In addition, there is no description of what
the Environmental Impact Statement means when it refers
to noise level projections. (EIS, p. A-6.) Finally,
the EPA response notes that the noise exposure forecast
includes a monastery, two churches, two schools, and a
university in an area of high exposure. Hence, "there
is a serious question whether the noise levels at these
institutions will be acceptable, especially when it is
clearly stated in the impact statement that such construc-
tion and activities should be avoided within this noise
exposure zone where possible." (EIS, p. A-7.) These ex-
amples would suggest that environmental criteria were not
foremost, or even particularly important, in the planning
and designing criteria that resulted in the Dallas/Fort
Worth Airport.
We do not mean to suggest that the Dallas/Fort Worth
Airport is by any means a disastrous project, a monstrous
failure, or even a badly designed airport. There are
certainly difficulties associated with the airport, es-
pecially political problems arising from its location and
design. We will develop the argument later in the paper
35
that the social and political problems of the airport
board and the airport management are far from over. In
our opinion, however, it is equally foolish to argue that
a technology the size or scale of D/FW Airport can be
undertaken, that is to say planned, so as to avoid or
even foresee all technical, social and political diffi-
culties.
Regardless of how rigorous and explicit one's metho-
dology,. it is evident that policy makers' assessments and
projections all too often will be wide.of the mark because:
(1) Assessments concern future states of affairs.
for which, by definition, there can be no data.
There is no reason ever to expect a forecast
to be "correct enough." How, for example, does
one plan for future values?
(2) Assessments must assert the likelihood of par-
ticular chains of consequences or events. Yet
present understanding of social causality is
minimal.
(3) Assessments require that the data to be gathered
be specified; the researcher must make
value-laden choices about the relative signif-
icance and insignificance of the data he will
collect. Data Collection is never a truly
"objective process."
(4) Assessments must eventually.enable the making
of choices; therefore, benefits must be mea-
sured.. But no widely accepted mechanism exists
for the measurement and comparison of social
costs and benefits.
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(5) Assessments must have arbitrarily defined
scopes; not all consequences can be con-
sidered. Analysts have little means of
guaranteeing that they have correctly de-
fined the problem.1 8
But Jack Downey, Deputy Executive Director of the D/FW
Airport Board, writes that long-range plans must anticipate
problems of the future to assure effective design and con-
tinued operating efficiency. (ICAO Bulletin, date missing,
pp. 8-12.) In some ways the D/FW Airport design represents
a serious attempt to discount the future in the planning/
designing process. The airport has a great deal of flexi-
bility designed into it, but it is a one-sided flexibility.
In other words, the airport can only grow, and really only
grow in certain ways. The idea of adaptability in the D/FW
plan does not include reversability. The plans did not, and
perhaps could not, anticipate unexpected or unplanned de-
velopments in aviation.
18 Todd R. LaPorte, Social Change, Public Response and
Regulation of Large-Scale Technology, December, 1972,
Institute of Governmental Studies, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, California.
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Surprising and Costly Consequences
of Passive Capacity and Technology
The flexible aspect of the airport's design is an
important step in the right direction, but it stopped
rather short of the mark.
D/FW represents an attempt to plan comprehensively.
Explanations about ground transportation, feeder highway
networks, fuel, electricity, cooling, and many other sup-
port services (from food to approach control), as well as
present and future aircraft design, were considered in
the planning process, and the result can be seen in the
Dallas/Fort Worth Airport today. But comprehensive ex-
pectations about the future are likely to result in mul-
tiplier or reinforcing error, which in turn yields unreal-
istic performance expectations and surprising consequences.
For example, fewer jumbo jets are using the airport than
had been expected; more people are transferring between
terminals than had been expected; fewer people are using
automobiles to go to the airport than had been expected;
and more people are riding the bus or limousine service,
Surtran, than had been expected.
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On the one hand, the predictions regarding use of
the facilities at D/FW appear to be unrealistic.* On the
other hand, mistaken assumptions about the future of com-
mercial aviation in American society further compounded
the error. The resultant design seems to be, in many
ways, inappropriate to present needs. D/FW, then, is
caught in a conflict between the level and type of use
required to satisfy the imperatives of its design and the
actual use it is experiencing.
Though the present facility is less than one-half its
planned size, as specified in the master plan, it is already
clear. that D/FW is overbuilt. It has a large passive or
excess capacity. Considerably .less than expected revenues,
together with airline requests to defer payment to Dallas
and Fort Worth for the initial study, indicate that the pro-
jections based on growth patterns of the 1950's and 1960's
were too optimistic. A news article reports that the Dallas/
Fort Worth Airport landing fee rate, already among the highest
in the nation, was increased more than 18 per cent to com-
pensate for nationwide airline cutbacks. (Dallas Morning
News, 11 Jan. 1974.) Furthermore,,because of the airlines'
trend to fly smaller and lighter aircraft, the decrease in
landing weights would result in a 1.26 million dollar loss
in revenue from landing fees.
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Similarly, a long and continuing controversy regard-
ing commuter flights flown from Dallas' Love Field devel-
oped. The cities' leaderships--especially that of Fort
Worth--feared that commuter flights would lead to revenue
losses at D/FW; which in turn, could lead to deficits which
would downgrade the classification of the bonds Dallas and Fort
Worth guaranteed in order to build the regional airport.
Altogether, nearly 600 million dollars in bonds were sold
to finance the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport. City officials
agreed that the airport bonds were likely to be downgraded
if there was a default in payment or continuing litigation
involving the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport. At the moment,
both appear likely. (Dallas Morning News, February 6, 1975).
Conflicts concerning D/FW financing, and particularly
Love Field's impact on D/FW revenues, offer clear indication
that the ancient controversy between the cities of Dallas
and.Fort Worth is far from over. The Dallas Morning News
reported that a suit to close Love Field, brought by the
City of Fort Worth, is a real possibility and could touch
off open warfare between the two cities. (Dallas Morning
News, 11 Jan. 1974.) In fact, there were indications some
time ago that "economic projections made several years
ago for the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport's first operational
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years appear to be inflated, sending airport financial ex-
perts to the drawing boards to escape an operating deficit
next year." (Dallas Morning News, 8 Apr. 1973.) The ar-
ticle continues that "the airlines are committed to making
up any expected deficit through an increase in landing fees
and sources say there is a limit to how much the airlines
can absorb." This, then, portends an operating deficit in
that the airlines quickly requested increased landing fees.
This past August, spokesmen for eight major airlines asked
the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth to cancel a $2,435,270
debt which the airlines owe under a regional airport contract.
The cities responded that they would need more tax money to
compensate for such a loss of anticipated revenue and, thus,
the councils in both cities voted to deny the request. The
spokesmen for the airlines argued that revenues from parking
at D/FW had been less than anticipated and problems with the
Airtrans system 19 had added to overall operating costs.
They went on to warn that other financial help might 
be
needed if the revenue picture at D/FW did not improve.
19 This is the people mover system built by Ling-Temco-
Vought (LTV), a Dallas based corporation. Airtrans system
is a rubbertired, electrically-powered, multi-purpose trans-
port system constructed to move along concrete guideways.
The system is intended to be fully automated and can reach
a maximum speed of 17 miles per hour along independent guide-
ways. (See Appendix,pp. 5-9.)
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Interestingly the Texas Association for Public Trans-
portation Newsletter, Vol. 1, No. 3, July, 1974) reports
that Surtran, the limousine service for D/FW,.is carrying
an average of 3700-3800 riders per day. This is 32 per
cent greater than the 2850 per day projected. The public
transportation publication goes on to say that airport
planners did not anticipate such an increased reliance on
public transit, so their predictions for D/FW automobile
parking revenues were overestimated by some $15,000 per day.
Finally, a photo in the Dallas Times Herald showed that most
of the 20 American-Eastern terminal gates were occupied
while only about one-third of the close-in parking lot was
full of cars. (Dallas Times Herald, 13 Oct. 1974.)
Airport officials indicate that the imbalance in revenues
results also from the greater than expected number of passenger
transfers; D/FW is the third largest transfer point in the
nation. In fact, the largest structure on the median strip
between the north-south access highway is a several-story,
completely unused, building intended for valet parking.
After this parking edifice had been constructed airport
administrators discovered it would cost about $6.50 per day
to park in the building on a valet basis and they concluded
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that at this price there was no demand for valet parking at
D/FW. Thus, this large, expensive structure is not open or
used for any purpose. 20
The airport manager reported in an interview that they
had expected approximately 50 per cent of the enplaning
passengers at D/FW to be transfers, while the actual figure
is about 60 per cent. Less than expected parking revenue is
not the only difficulty exacerbated by this unexpected
development.
First, the transfer ratio which is higher than anticipated
is placing a heavy demand on Airtrans, the terminal-to-terminal
people mover. Paradoxically, Airtrans may be a manifestation
of overbuilding that is inadequate for the demand.21 That is,
Airtrans is a very costly, independent ground transport system
that has not to date been particularly reliable or efficient.
In addition, the roadways to support an independent trans-
portation network are in place. The faltering Airtrans system
20
The valet parking structure is five-tier, concrete and
steel, designed to store 1,795 automobiles. The cost
of construction was 2.5 million dollars.
21 We will expand the description and analysis of Airtrans
below. (See Appendix, pp. 6-9.)
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requires that buses and trucks be utilized to transfer
employees, baggage and the U.S. mail. In short, the airport
supports two fully developed modes of internal transportation.
Similarly, the automated, computerized baggage system
installed by the major airlines at D/FW cost several million
dollars. This "Telecar Baggage System" has not proved a sat-
isfactory system. Bags have been lost or routed to the wrong
terminal, thereby further complicating interline transfers for
people passing through D/FW. Recently, Braniff and American
Airlines spent approximately two million dollars each to
modify or partially replace this expensive baggage system with
more conventional, rather simpler, hand-loaded conveyor mecha-
nisms. Thus, it seems that the airlines, even though they are
financially strained at D/FW, are spending several million
additional (unplanned) dollars to improve the baggage transfer
system.
We are in a period of unprecedented inflation in modern
America. Economic. exacerbation further strains the financial
system of D/FW in that one finds unavoidably increased costs at
the same.time that real revenues are decreasing because of
inflation.
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There is yet other evidence that D/FW is overbuilt.
We observed that the airport is using approximately one-
sixth of its cooling capacity. The plant technicians re-
ported that the airport's needs are readily met by one of
the airport's three coolers.22 The chief project engineer
admitted in an interview that a centralized utility complex
that was not used to capacity was, in the short term,
expensive and inefficient.
Also, the manager of the airport's food preparation and
distribution facility argued that the new food preparation
building was far too big and that production was impeded
because his employees had to cover great distances to get
supplies and prepare food.
Such passive capacity means that the cost of future
expansion will be lessened if it is needed. Both passive
technologies and capacities are difficult to support in the
near term, and the revenue deficit at D/FW is a good example.
This does not mean that the revenue deficit is due only to
overbuilding or overdesigning. Excess.capacity adds further
22 Space for another large cooler has been provided in the
utilities building. This would enable a 25 per cent in-
crease in overall capacity. In other words, three of
four coolers have been installed and the report is that
only one of the three, operating at 50-60 per cent
capacity, is needed.
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strain in a context of optimistic predictions and excessive
inflation. In short, excess capacities and technologies are
unlikely to pay for themselves in the early stages, and
the airlines are going to the primary sources of their sup-
port, Dallas and Fort Worth, to make up the deficit. As a
result, a difficult, perhaps explosive, political situation
may be developing between revenue-hungry local governments
and a revenue-hungry airport board--each looking to the
other for fiscal relief. A local paper quotes the Tarrant
County Tax Assessor and Collector saying that he was "ready
to go to court to collect taxes on the hotel at Dallas/Fort
Worth Airport." (Dallas Morning News, 6 Apr. 1974.) The
management of the hotel reportedly informed the assessor-
collector that they would pay tax on furnishings and other
personal property, but they would not pay an assessment on
their building. Later it was reported that Tarrant County
Assessor-Collector Reed Stewart expected "a court battle
to determine how far governmental units may go in taxing
Airlines." (Dallas Morning News, 30 Aug. 1974.)
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The Imperatives to Excess Capacity
On the one hand, airport management and the airlines
are looking to local governments for debt relief, while
at the same time other local governments are actively
exploring the revenue potential of the new airport. This
is an especially difficult problem because 85 per cent of
the D/FW patronage comes from Dallas' suburbs. Strangely
enough, it was these Dallas' suburbs who voted against the
referendum to approve the bond issue enabling the D/FW pro-
ject. Tarrant County and its major city, Fort Worth, supported
the bond issue in the first vote, but the land issue was not
approved in the City or County of Dallas. The following
year the wealthy and politically influential businessmen in
Dallas conducted an expensive, high pressure campaign to
get residents in the City of Dallas to approve the bonds.
In the second vote then, the bonds were approved by the City
of Dallas voters.' Thus, airport bonds were eventually ap-
proved in Tarrant County, the City of Fort Worth, and the
City of Dallas; the suburban Dallas County voters, however,
declined to assume the indebtedness.2 3 The airport project
23 Some contend that the vote and the issues in these two
bond campaigns indicate that the Dallas suburbanites
voted against the Dallas political and business elite
rather than against a big, expensive airport. In fact,
for many of these suburbanites, D/FW is nearly as
close as Love Field.
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was salvaged at this initial stage only because Dallas' civic
leaders decided that the airport must be built.
The question is, then, why were the civic leaders in
Dallas so determined that a large scale airport be built?
Was it simply that the Civil Aeronautics Board and the FAA
told the Cities of Dallas and Fort Worth that they must join
together and build a single regional airport? While we think
this was a necessary condition, it was not sufficient. The
citizens of Dallas, particularly the business and political
leadership of the city, had ignored such federal directives
before. Love Field was developed in reaction to a federal
order. In fact, Fort Worth had far more to gain than did
Dallas in supporting a regional airport. Therefore, several
alternative hypotheses are possible specifying what led the
Dallas leadership to favor the proposed D/FW project.
First, thereare indications that Dallas' business and
civic leaders believe that Dallas can become a world finan-
cial center. Since the D/FW project began, they have.built
the world's largest Trade Mart. They have tried to get voter
approval for a major canal linking Dallas-Fort Worth to the
Gulf of Mexico. Ironically, this proposal was defeated by
the voters of Dallas County and, as yet, Dallas' civic leaders
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have not been able to resurrect it.24  In short, it appears
that the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport was intended to serve a
symbolic, as much as an instrumental, purpose.
Civic leaders seemed to be looking to the airport as a
psychological and an economic multiplier, as well as a tech-
nology to facilitate air transport to and from the area.25
The mass media clearly reflects this intention reporting that
the impact of the new Dallas/Fort Worth Airport on the land-
locked.metroplex can only be calculated in billions of dollars.
(See, for example, Dallas Times Herald, 17 Mar. 1974.) Such
claims argue that the effects of D/FW will unwittingly touch
every man, woman, and child in the metroplex. "The total
direct and indirect impact of the airport in 1975 is estimated
to be 637 million dollars spread into virtually every industry
24 The rural counties along the proposed canal route generally
supported the project, while Dallas and Tarrant County
voters defeated the proposal. (Dallas Times Herald,
14 Mar. 1973, p. 1.)
25 John Shaffer, FAA administrator, at ground breaking cere-
monies for the control tower on 15 July 1971 said: "Trans-
portation has played a key role in the building of the
world's great cities. All roads led to Rome. London was
built by the sailing ship. New York City gained status
as a steamship port. Chicago grew by the railroads. No
city has yet reached its greatness by aviation. The fa-
cility being built by Dallas and Fort Worth will fulfill
this destiny."
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sector and through these pipelines a significant percentage
will, of course, end up as profits from local sales and in
payrolls in every type of business." (Dallas Times Herald,
17 Mar. 1974.) In an article in Southern Living, then
Executive Director of the Airport, Thomas Sullivan, who is
given credit for being the driving energy and the vision
behind the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, was quoted as saying:
"It is my philosophy that an airport is not an end in itself.
I believe instead it is a means for a rational development
of the entire economic area in which it is located."
(Southern Living, Aug. 1973, p. 47.) It is clear, however,
that Dallas and Fort Worth are not yet world trade centers.
There are few foreign banks represented in the Dallas-
Fort Worth area. Texas International Airlines and Braniff
International Airlines do offer direct international flights
from the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, but only to Latin America.
2 6
Of the two cities, Dallas has been and continues to be the im-
portant regional financial center, but the Dallas-Fort Worth
area has not yet achieved international status.
We have been unable to find evidence that a plan other
than that displaying the basic characteristics of D/FW was
26 Texas International has a very limited international route
structure. Thus, Braniff is the only full-scale inter-
national airline presently operating from D/FW.
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seriously considered by local politicians or planners,
designers or engineers hired by the local civic and polit-
ical leadership. It is true that the first Executive Direc-
tor of the Airport, Thomas Sullivan, inherited an embryonic
hub design which he quickly changed to the present linear
or spinal structure, but this seems to be in keeping with our
argument that it was assumed from the beginning that D/FW
would be a very large, noteworthy airport. The Environmental
Impact Statement, submitted by the TAMS consulting group,
gives very short shrift to the question of alternatives.
Quoting from page E of the Impact Statement:
Several alternatives to the present project were
explored, including major expansion of Love Field,
the existing aircarrier airport for the area; major
expansion of Greater Southwest International Airport
which is immediately south of the present site;
major expansion of both of the above airports; a
new site on the Dallas-Tarrant County line (south
of the existing site); and the alternative of doing
nothing.
This is all that is said in the consulting engineer's report
regarding alternative considerations. We could not find
evidence that these possibilities and others were seriously
evaluated by the TAMS group, the political leadership, or
the citizenry. In other words, there is no indication that
the positive and negative attributes of alternative pos-
sibilities were carefully explored.
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Such cursory treatment of alternatives further
suggests that D/FW was to reflect and play an important
symbolic and psychological role, as well as one of pure
utility. We have noted that much of the literature
publicizing and describing the new airport echoes concern
for the airport's image more than for its function.
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The Image and the Reality
Publicity for the D/FW project passed through three
stages. First, during the early construction phases, the
public relations effort was directed toward "public educa-
tion." The thrust was to let people know what was occur-
ring or how the project was progressing. Second, publicity
was considerably expanded as the opening date approached.
Several firms were hired to create an image of the new air-
port and to generate local, national, and international
awareness of the airport as an integral part of the Dallas-
Fort Worth economic and social setting. Third, a campaign
to convince D/FW's patrons of its workability and desira-
bility became necessary after the airport opened because of
the many difficulties which were encountered.
Through the construction stages, airport administrators
worked constantly to inform local citizens about D/FW.
Airport representatives were always available to speak before
groups. A telephone rotary was installed, and people were
encouraged to call with questions or suggestions, about D/FW.
This first.public relations effort was regarded as the most
successful by the airport administration. Throughout this
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"education" phase, D/FW was depicted as a symbol of future
growth and strength in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. 2 7
The dedication ceremonies marked a turning point in
D/FW's public image. Initially, the dedication and the open-
ing of the airport were planned for the same day. The open-
ing was delayed, however, because the airlines were having
difficulties moving to the new facility. Thus, the dedica-
tion was held on Saturday, September 22, 1973, while the
opening was delayed until January 13, 1974.
Months of preparation went into the dedication weekend
activities. The dedication, like the airport, was planned
with the assumption in mind that bigger is better. An ex-
travagant.cocktail party was held for the guests in the.Delta
terminal. The opening ceremonies introduced the world.to
the airport ,
On the Friday prior to the Sunday dedication, a cocktail
party and tour was held for the press. Saturday's papers
were filled with complaints of missed tour buses, too .few
press kits, inadequate service, and distressing tales of
disorganization throughout the airport. Saturday was no
better; visitors complained bitterly, about disorganization
27 Examples of phase 1 advertising included pamphlets en-
titled "The Airport of the Future Today" and "The First
of a New Breed of Giant Jetports."
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and confusion. By Monday morning, the new airport had
already made enemies and flight operations had not as yet
commenced.
The local press quickly forgot the events of the dedica-
tion ceremonies, and three months later news of the opening
filled the local papers. Although the cliches used to de-
scribe D/FW were numerous, they had one thing in common.
If you knew nothing else about the airport, you knew it
was big. The most often used phrase was: "an airport the
size of Manhattan." (See Appendix, p. 10.) A variety of
public relations techniques was used to illustrate the
vast size of the airport. PR men dwelled at length on the
size, newness, and innovativeness of the airport and ap-
parently never checked into its practicality for an air
traveler.
Because of this sustained build-up, everyone was ex-
pecting a truly super airport; they found instead problems
that matched the size of the airport. Passengers complained
of long waits and great confusion. This was perhaps to be
expected, but numerous equipment malfunctions and increasing
friction between traveler and airport surprised airport
officials. For example, the automated baggage system had
a propensity for shredding baggage rather than simply losing
it. The Airtrans people mover experienced a variety of
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difficulties that infuriated people who missed planes or
found themselves stranded out on the track.
Moreover, the amount of change one had to carry to go
through the airport engendered bad feelings and bad press.
It cost a quarter to bring a car into the airport, a quarter
to move from terminal-to-terminal on Airtrans, and a quarter
to use the telephone. People complained of being "quartered
to death."
Ironically, probably the single most talked about bad
deal at the airport was the dollar changers that returned
only 95 cents. The airport's Operations Director pointed
out in an interview that these dollar changers were nothing
new.. He said that riany airports throughout the country have
similar machines. The nickel is kept as a service charge.
For example, the dollar changer at the Dallas Greyhound Bus
Terminal returns only 95 cents.
The new airport, which was expected to garner praise,
gathered stinging- criticism instead.. The bad press was a
severe blow. A Time magazine article reported for all to
see that travelers and travel agents were doing anything
they could to stay from D/FW. (Time, 24 June 1974,p. 56.)
Many people appear to have developed negative attitudes
56
about the airport, and these have not been
easy to combat.28
The bad press has had an effect on the airport, but
it is difficult to judge how much. The problems D/FW was
having were mentioned at the Civil Aeronautics Board hear-
ings in Phoenix this past summer (1974). The hearings were
preliminary to awards of new international routes, and D/FW's
reputation seems to have been weakening the airlines' requests.
Braniff International Airlines, which had been clinging
stubbornly to commuter flights from Love Field, moved com-
pletely to D/FW in exchange for CAB consideration of its
request for new international routes.
28
The following is a somewhat vituperative, though not un-
common, example of post-opening press for D/FW:
"The new Dallas/Fort Worth Airport doesn't have, among
other things, a chapel, movies or television, public ob-
servation decks, valet or helicopter services, mailboxes,
a drug prescription service, or a first class restaurant.
It also doesn't have legions of undying admirers.
"The reason for the lack of unabashed, pennant waving fans
is that the airport confused, frustrated, angered and de-
layed many a passenger during the opening days. There
were traffic jams, baggage shredded on conveyor belts,
interminable waiting periods for late flights and over-
priced food, drink and services. What had been touted as
the instant nirvana for the jet-age traveler turned out
to be something a lot closer to a Busby Berkley number
choreographed by a brain-damaged loon." ("Sunday Maga-
zine," Dallas Times Herald, 17 Feb. 1974.)
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The administration at D/FW is working to overcome its
poor reputation. A film is being made about the airport
for viewing by travel agents throughout the country. More-
over, progress is being made; baggage handling systems have
been replaced,and Airtrans, though performing only part
of its intended services, is transferring passengers
more reliably.
What appeared to be a negative overreaction to the new
airport and its start-up problems is understandable if
characterized as an unanticipated consequence of shaping
expectations more from symbolic than utilitarian values.
The airport, and particularly the terminals, are.smartly
decorated and attractive to the eye. -As-one observer re-
ported, they seem to be gold and platinum plated, but are
not particularly comfortable--again, the concern for D/FW
as a symbol rather than for the user. If one believes the
publicity, it is most important that an airport be attractive,
big, and important. The airport is apparently to typify
Dallas/Fort Worth as an attractive, vibrant center for
financial interests rather than to provide convenience,
comfort, and transportation for people.
One could argue that the fundamental purpose for that
cluster of technologies called an airport is to enable con-
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venient, timely, effortless transition from ground to air
and from air to ground. An airport is a pass-through, a
means to facilitate a change of transportation mode. Yet,
if one is to believe Executive Director Thomas Sullivan,
quoted above, an airport is not a means to facilitate change
of transportation modes so much as a rational means to
develop the economy of a region.
The symbolic or psychological concerns reflected in
the design of the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport suggest as well
that it was planned .and constructed more as an end-in-
itself than as a means to an end. We noted, for example,
that the physical design of the airport does not really fa-
cilitate airline to airline transfer of people requiring
connecting flights. The airport's Operation Director stated
in an interview that persons arriving for transfer to an-
other airline needed nearly an hour to assure successful
change. He indicated that this was a very difficult problem
and that they were having a hard time alleviating it.
The most noticeable villain in this particular drama
is the ailing Airtrans people mover system built by Ling-
Temco-Vought (LTV), a Dallas-based corporation. Airtrans
added 35 million dollars to the construction cost at D/FW.
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It was designed to carry patrons, employees, baggage, mail,
supplies, and trash. Presently, Airtrans carries only
passengers, some baggage, and occasional trash. Employees,
as we said, use the bus system; most baggage is transferred
by truck; supplies and food are transported to and from the
flight kitchens by truck; and recently the Post Office
announced that it would not transfer mail on Airtrans until
it is more reliable. In short, only two of six functions
are presently operable.
Furthermore, an American Airlines official reported
that American is inaugurating its own bus service for con-
necting passengers transferring from certain other flights.
(Dallas Times Herald, 8 Sept. 1974.) American's management
stated that missed connections result in poor customer re-
lations. Texas International already has mini-buses operating from
its terminal to assure passengers with close connections of
catching their flights on other airlines. Delta Airlines
uses station wagons for the same purpose.
During an airport operations committee meeting, the
four car rental agencies serving D/FW from desks in the
north and south remote parking lots, received approval to
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detail plans for carrying customers between the lots and
terminals to mini-buses or station wagons. 29
It is somewhat surprising that Airtrans has been the
source of so many problems. First, it reportedly was built
largely from off-the-shelf items, and little in the design
was new. Second, it is intended to be an automatic system;
technicians on duty at the Airtrans Control Central reported
that it was designed so that only two employees were needed
for monitor and control. At present, Airtrans Control Cen-
ter is manned by four airport board employees and six or
more LTV engineers.
It was also reported that an additional 2 or 3 million
dollars have been spent since the airport opened to improve
Airtrans operations. The passenger loading stations are
nearly always manned by attendants, and, quite often,
attendants will be riding in most cars on the guideway.
Of course, the design calls for no such attendants, either
in stations or in individual cars. Our observations of
the Airtrans systems suggest that, like all relatively
complicated man-machine systems, it is most vulnerable
under stress. The system appears to work smoothly and
29 See Appendix, p. 12, for a discussion of Airtrans, and
in particular, the contract-letting procedure through
which LTV received the contract to build it.
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without difficulty most of the time. However, during those
periods of the morning and evening when demand is heaviest,
we have noticed that the system is most likely to create pas-
senger delays. Naturally, this does lead to bad publicity
and bad feelings about the Airtrans system in particular and
D/FW in general.
In sum, we find that D/FW presents an over-large, over-
elegant edifice that promises more than it delivers. The
gap between promise and performance has clearly resulted in
a nationwide flurry of very unfavorable publicity for the
Dallas/Fort Worth Airport. Major articles in such widely
distributed periodicals as Time and Newsweek have presented
an adverse image of the airport, as have negative refer-
ences on television's popular "Tonight Show." Furthermore,
administrators at the airport confess they are taking
positive, and rather far reaching, steps to neutralize such
adverse publicity. Despite the Operations Director's ad-
mission that the airport is spending a good deal of money
trying to re-educate the press and travel agents around the
country, the adverse publicity continues. In the past two
months, however, there have been fewer airport related items
in the local press and on local news stations. And good
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news as a ratio of the total news concerning D/FW has
improved noticeably. Locally, at least, the bad news seems
to be evaporating.
Yet, there is little evidence that the problems we
have outlined are resolved. Recently, an evening news broad-
cast on a local television station reported that D/FW lost
2 million dollars in its first six months of operation. That
would seem to be an important story, but this news item was
not repeated or reported elsewhere. At that time, the Airport
Board members left a meeting brushing aside questions with a
quick "no.comment" on a matter which eventually may cost tax-
payers millions of dollars if airport revenues fail to meet
bond payments. (See especially Dallas Morning News, 10 Aug.
1974.) Another time, Board members met in what was announced
as an emergency session to consider the legal implications
of Airtrans' inability to function properly for even one day
since the airport opened. Again, Board members avoided com-
ment, claiming they were bound by legal considerations. It
seems that in the last six months a "no press is better than a
bad press" attitude has developed. But perhaps the result will
be to direct attention toward the function and away from the
symbol.
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Technology: Physical Entity or Complex
Socio-Mechanical Organization
Perhaps the most promising way to characterize the
planning and design processes that resulted in D/FW is one
of conceptions of technology. The evidence is over-
whelming that those associated with the plan, design, and
construction of the airport assumed it was primarily a nuts
and bolts problem involving structures and machines. It is
clear, however, that technologies on the scale.of D/FW have an
important social component from first.to last. Many of the
problems the airport is experiencing, and in particular the
socio-political difficulties, are a consequence of the per-
ceptions held by those who were associated with the airport.
They beheld it as a cluster of structural or mechanical prob-
lems to be solved by technicians rather than as a complex,
interactive, socio-technical system.30
Yet the social element was important even in the con-
struction phase. The engineer responsible for coordinating
30 Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy and Stratton, the engineering
firm that had overall design and construction responsi-
bility for D/FW, is staffed completelylby professional
engineers. Jack Downey, the Deputy Director of the air-
port board, is.an engineer, and Tom Sullivan, the Execu-
tive Director of the airport board, is an experienced
physical planner.
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the construction effort reported in an interview that the
single, most pervasive problem during the construction
phase, other than coordinating dozens of subcontractors,
was that everyone had "this is the biggest" fever. Every-
one wanted to have the longest, the biggest, the heaviest,
or the most. That, he argued, was a giant headache. There
are claims of the most concrete ever poured on a single
project; the most concrete poured in a day; the largest
central air conditioning system, and so on.
Another way of classifying technologies is in terms
of prescriptive and adaptive categories. (See LaPorte,
June 1974, [unpublished] and Zwerling, 1974, for an expan-
sion of this argument.) Prescriptive technologies influence
the development of social values and public life. "Adaptive
technologies are shaped by human values; their producers
respond to changes in social values and alter their design
accordingly." (LaPorte, 1974,.p. 10.) Adaptive technolo-
gies, such as computers or bus-based transport systems, can
readily adapt to different social patterns. Prescriptive
technologies, on the other hand, have an image of future
society embedded in their design. It seems clear that the
designers of D/FW. had a vision of the future of air travel
and air transport. As we have indicated, investment in an
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undertaking like D/FW is necessarily very great, and the
tendency--particularly in the case of a publicly funded,
prescriptive technology--is to use public authority to
coerce people into changing their behavior in order to use
the technology.
We have argued that visions of the future are not
likely to be particularly accurate. We have implied that
attempts to control the future will, at best, be frustra-
ting and, at worst, tyrannical. Therefore, large-scale,
prescriptive technologies should be avoided whenever
possible. In order to do so, we have suggested that flexi-
bility is the crucial design imperative. The policy-maker,
planner and designer must always return to questions of
reversability: alternative use for land, structure, and
machines, and capacity for contraction as well as expansion.
Finally, we may hypothesize that those who did plan
the airport were using an improper or inappropriate view,
a narrow rather than a broad perspective, which in turn has
been partially responsible for some of the aforementioned
problems. It seems to us that if these problems are
attacked with the same narrow perspectives, further prob-
lems will ensue. Again, the solutions will not be appropri-
ate, and the cycle may continue for quite some time as
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the enterprise staggers under technical, financial, and
political difficulties.
It is clear that this report has been a baseline effort,
as we suggested at the outset. Many questions and problems
are still unresolved. The financial difficulties will not
be easily resolved. In a period of economic depression,
the airlines, the surrounding local governments, and the
airport board will be pressed for ways to generate revenue
and prevent D/FW from going more into the red. For example,
we discovered recently that D/FW, probably in hope of easing
the revenue squeeze, is opening some land within its bounda-
ries for private development. This will diminish, of course,
the aesthetic and functional power of the airport's master
plan. In short,.this choice further diminishes the plan's
hold on the future.
The litigations growing out of the Love Field controversy
and Airtrans are potentially crippling to D/FW and are likely
to create new political schisms between the cities of Dallas
and Fort Worth. (Dallas Morning News, January 9, 1975).
Questions remain about the impact of international routes on
the difficulties at D/FW and on the region. So, too, questions
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about the consequence of a considerably overestimated future
for air cargo persist. Questions regarding the future of STOL
transport as it relates to D/FW, the region, and the regional
airport concept go unanswered.3 1
31 We are not able to accomplish as much as we had hoped
in regard to STOL. But when LaPorte's study of Ohio
is completed, we will have the other half of the
puzzle and will be able to make some conceptual con-
nections between his work and our own.
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
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Acker, Ed. Vice-President, Braniff International Airlines.
Burnett, Pat, Council for Advance Transportation Studies,
Austin, Texas
Deakens, Mrs. K., personal secretary to Amon G. Carter.
Dean, Ernest, Executive Director, Dallas/Fort Worth Regional
Airport.
Dunlay, Professor William, Council for Advance Transpor-
tation Studies, Austin, Texas.
Ford, Fred, Manager of Operations, Dallas/Fort Worth
Regional Airport.
Heath, Robert, Air Transportation Planner, North Texas
Council of Governments.
Holloway, Joan, Examiner, Texas Aeronautics Commission,
Austin, Texas.
Jarrett, Richard, Manager of Surtran.
Kelley, Jim, Chief Engineer in Charge of Construction,
Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport. Also associated
with the firm of Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton
Design Engineers.
King, Roland, Vice-President and founder of Southwest Air-
lines.
Macredy, Howard, Aviation Director, City of Dallas, Texas.
Maxhim, Ken, Design Engineer, DOCUTAL Corporation.
Means, Professor Robert C., School of Law, University of
Texas., Austin, Texas.
Murphy, Charles, Director, Texas Aeronautics Commission,
Austin, Texas.
Myers, George L., Field Representative, Southwest Region,
Civil Aeronautics Board, Fort Worth, Texas.
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Preston, Lloyd, Aviation Director, City of Fort Worth,
Texas.
Riddell, Charles, Environmental Protection Agency, Hazard-
ous Materials Division, Dallas, Texas.
Rogers, Billy, Texas Highway Department, Austin, Texas.
Shaw, Jim, Research Associates, City and Regional Planning,
University of Texas, Austin, Texas.
Sletta, Inez, Transport Planner, Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, Dallas, Texas.
Sorrenson, Don, Assistant for Aviation, City of Dallas.
Presently employed by Braniff International Airlines
as Director of Properties.
Stovall, R. M., Mayor, City of Fort Worth, Texas. Also,
member of Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport Board.
Texas Water Development Board, Austin, Texas. (Discussed
with several persons the problems relating-to an aquifier
beneath the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport area.)
Thompson, John, Director of Transportation, North Texas
Council of Governments.
Tubbs, Kenneth, Transportation Manager, Chamber of Commerce,
Dallas, Texas.
Wegnor, Bob, Director of Regional Planning, North Texas
Council of Governments.
Wise, Wes, Mayor, City of Dallas, Texas. Also, member of
Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport Board.
Many of these individuals were interviewed on more than
one occasion.
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GRS Controls
automate personal transit system
at Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport
A GRS computer-interfaced electronic Programmed speeds provide smooth,
control system ensures uniquely effec- comfortable station stops and starts.
tive operation for this automated per- GRS transit control systems are serv-
sonal transit system. ing Boston, Chicago, Cleveland,
The GRS system con- New York, Staten Island,
trols all vehicle opera- and Toronto... and will
tions: speeds, braking, soon serve Washington,
protective separation, D.C. GRS controls were
switching, and station on board the original
and vehicle doors. Disneyland monorail and
the Seattle monorail.
The vehicles pick
up power and
control information
from rails along -------- GENERAL RAILWAY SIGNAL
the guideway. RCHCESTER NEW YORK 146 
A UNIT OF GENERAL SIGNAL
A The onboard automation
equipment is in a case The automation system
beneath a luggage operates 68 "Airtrans"
storage shelf (shown vehicles over 13 miles
here removed) of guideways.
4
-VIF
14<
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II
Ironically, Airtrans has been more re-
sponsible for "illnesses" of this kind
than any other sub-system at D/FW.
Airtrans cures major terminal illnesses.
The worst part of most flights has nothing to do with airplanes. It's getting
SPto, from and around the airport.
PARK And since the Dallas/Ft. Worth (DFW) Airport is the largest in the world,
* the potential problems are staggering.
.OZARK So the ground transportation system here is much more than a people
SFRONTIER mover. It had to be. It had to be planned integrally, from the outset, as a
BRANIFF * TEXAS key element, tying the airport together.SINTERNATONAL It had to be AIRTRANS-the most complete, fully automatic
* o EASTERN transportation system in the world. 13 miles of door to door service toI 53 doors- provided by 51 AIRTRANS personnel vehicles and 17 utility
NORTH HOTEL AMERICAN vehicles. All in a totally controlled environment.
. It's a total ground support system that can move 9000 people an hour,
*. CONTINENTAL 6000 bags an hour and 70,000 lb. of mail an hour. In addition, AIRTRANS
* PASSENGER STATION • removes trash from the terminals and delivers supplies to them. All of it
* EMPLOYEE STATION DELTA done efficiently and safely, at a smooth 17 mph. With guarantees on trip
STRASH ISTATION times and mechanical performance.
SSUPPLIES STATION AIRTRANS is a complete system package. A one-of-a-kind installation
as are other LTV Aerospace transportation systems. And since it is
PARK* completely electric, it's clean and quiet as well. AIRTRANS doesn't add to
*one problem while it's solving others.
TRANSPORTATION , LTV AEROSPACE CORPORATION
CENTER 0 GRD U D TRANfSPORTATION DIVISION
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The Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport is operated by
the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport Board. The Board
was established on September 27, 1965, by enabling legisla-
tion whereby the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth became
the joint guarantors of this venture.
The Airport Board was authorized and directed to plan,
develop, construct, operate, regulate, and police D/FW. It
consists of eleven appointed members, seven from the city
of Dallas and four from the city of Fort Worth. Initial,
appointments to the Board by the respective city councils
were for terms of two years for six members and terms of
four years for five. members. All successive appointments
are for four year terms. Members of the Board serve with-
out compensation.
Appendix, p. 12
Awarding the Airtrans contract to LTV was a contro-
versial decision. In the first round of bidding, five
firms substantially overbid the Airport Board estimate of
30 million dollars. In the second round, LTV's bid was
not the lowest total bid. The Board, defending the LTV
award, stated publicly that LTV was an on-site firm, that
LTV had no large contracts pending and local personnel were
available to work on the project, and that their design re-
quired only off-the-shelf components except for the soft-
ware. Westinghouse Corporation, the lowest bidder, threat-
ened court action, although this never materialized. One
may readily infer that because LTV was a local concern,
and because imminent cuts in defense contracts would cer-
tainly affect this corporation, it was reasonable, from
the perspective of the local political leaders, to award
the contract to LTV.
We made several attempts to contactvarious individuals
at LTV associated with Airtrans, including A. L. Head, chief
supervisor. In all instances we were refused interviews.
We did have, however, some discussions with LTV engineers
at D/FW who were working on Airtrans problems.
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ENPLANEMENT DATA
Airline Airport
Fitted Datal Estimate Board Vorhees
2
1975. 10,500,000 11,091,000 7,950,000 11,735,000
1980 12,400,000 15,500,000 13,000,000 15,100,000
1985 14,300,000 21,713,000 Non Avail- 24,070,000
able
1990 16,200,000
'A linear program which fitted Love Field data for the years
1960-1973, controlling for the impact of GSIA on Love Field
enplanement, was used. The fitted data curve was derived
from the equation ENPLANEMENTS = TIME x 3.8E05 - .74E09.
The resulting R2 was .98.
2 The Vorhees consulting group generated projections for many
airport uses. But the underlying information and assump-
tions used by the consultant groups to create their pro-
jections were not available to us.
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CARGO DATA 4
Texas Trans- Airport
Extended portation Master D/FW Press
Datal Institute Plan (TAMS)2  Fact Sheet 3
1975 87,257 111,400 150,000 100,000
1980 123,819 196,700 Non Avail- 160,000
able
1985 184,047 361,300 600,000 250,000
1990 264,613 670,200 None Avail-
able
1
Our very optimistic cargo curve was derived by adding a
6.25 per cent annual increment through 1975 to the actual
data for Love Field. An increment of 7.25 per cent was
used for the period of 1976-1980, 8.25 per cent for 1981-
1985, and 9.24 per cent for 1986-1990. The one per cent
increase every five years is to compensate for general
economic growth.
2 Data prepared by Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton.
Data appeared in press kit prepared for opening day cere-
monies.
4 Figures on airmail operations at Love Field during the
period from 1970 to 1973 show a decrease in airmail ton-
age from 34,362 to 33,090.. The Vorhees study projects
78,880 tons of airmail at Dallas/Fort Worth Regional
Airport in the year 1975. This is an increase of 138
per cent over a two-year period.
